CIT 在 Slip Op. 26-101 中维持 USITC 对十四国铝挤压材的否定性终裁
U.S. Aluminum Extruders Coal. v. United States Public version: 09/15/2026.
CIT（美国国际贸易法院）在 Slip Op. 26-101（Consol. Court No. 24-00209）中判决，全面维持 USITC 对原产于中国、哥伦比亚、厄瓜多尔、印度、印度尼西亚、意大利、马来西亚、墨西哥、韩国、台湾地区、泰国、土耳其、阿联酋和越南的铝挤压材反倾销与反补贴调查作出的否定性终裁，并驳回原告要求就机构记录作出判决的动议。涉案终裁见 89 Fed. Reg. 92,720（2024 年 11 月 22 日），案号 Inv. Nos. 701-TA-695-698 和 731-TA-1643-1644 及 1646-1657（Final），USITC Pub. 5560。
CIT 维持 USITC 对十四国铝挤压材的否定性终裁，相关进口不因本次诉讼产生 AD/CVD 命令或保证金义务。
译文尚不完整，完整内容请切换到原文。
PPUBLIC VERSION
Slip Op. 26-101
UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
U.S. ALUMINUM EXTRUDERS COALITION,
and
UNITED STEEL, PAPER, AND FORESTRY, RUBBER, MANUFACTURING, ENERGY, ALLIED INDUSTRIAL AND SERVICE WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION,
Plaintiffs,
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant,
and
COALITION FOR FAIR MEXICAN IMPORTS OF ALUMINUM EXTRUSIONS, et al.,
Defendant-Intervenors.
Before: Joseph A. Laroski, Jr., Judge
Consol. Court No. 24-00209
OPINION
[Sustaining in full the final negative determination of the U.S. International Trade Commission concerning its antidumping and countervailing duty investigations of aluminum extrusions from China, Colombia, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Italy, Malaysia, Mexico, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and Vietnam and denying plaintiffs’ motion for judgment on the agency record.]
Dated: September 02, 2026
Robert E. DeFrancesco, III, of Wiley Rein LLP, of Washington, D.C., for plaintiffs U.S. Aluminum Extruders Coalition and United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union.
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With him on the brief were Alan H. Price, Elizabeth S. Lee, Enbar Toledano, and Laura El-Sabaawi. Michael K. Haldenstein, Attorney-Advisor, Office of the General Counsel, U.S. International Trade Commission, of Washington, D.C., for defendant United States. With him on the brief were Margaret D. MacDonald, General Counsel, Karl S. Von Schriltz, Assistant General Counsel, and Anthony C. Famiglietti, Attorney-Advisor. Eugene Degnan, of Morris, Manning & Martin LLP, of Washington, D.C., for defendant-intervenor East Asia Aluminum Co., Ltd. With him on the brief were Donald B. Cameron, Julie C. Mendoza, R. Will Planert, Brady W. Mills, Mary S. Hodgins, Jordan L. Fleischer, Edward J. Thomas III, Nicholas C. Duffey, and Jenny (Shiyu) Liang. Jack A. Levy, of Rock Creek Trade LLP, Jessica R. DiPietro, of ArentFox Schiff LLP, Daniel L. Porter, of Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP, Douglas J. Heffner, of Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP, Kelsey Christensen, of Clark Hill PLC, and Matthew Robert Nicely, of Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, of Washington, D.C., for defendant-intervenors Coalition for Fair Mexican Exports of Aluminum Extrusion, Danfoss LLC, and Dorman Products, Inc., et al.
Laroski, Judge: This action concerns the U.S. International Trade Commission’s
final negative determination in its antidumping and countervailing duty
investigations concerning aluminum extrusions imported from China, Colombia,
Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Italy, Malaysia, Mexico, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand,
Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and Vietnam. Aluminum Extrusions from China,
Colombia, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Italy, Malaysia, Mexico, South Korea, Taiwan,
Thailand, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and Vietnam, 89 Fed. Reg. 92,720 (Int’l.
Trade Comm’n. Nov. 22, 2024) (“Final Determination”); see also the accompanying
views of the Commission in Aluminum Extrusions from China, Colombia, Ecuador,
India, Indonesia, Italy, Malaysia, Mexico, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey,
United Arab Emirates, and Vietnam, USITC Pub. 5560, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-695-698
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and 731-TA-1643-1644 and 1646-1657 (Final), P.R. 354, C.R. 915 (Nov. 20, 2024)
(“Views”). In that determination, the U.S. International Trade Commission
(“Commission”) concluded that the domestic industry was not materially injured
and was not threatened with material injury by reason of subject imports.1
U.S. Aluminum Extruders Coalition and the United Steel, Paper and
Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers
International Union (collectively, “plaintiffs”) challenge the Commission’s
determination under section 516A of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (“the Act”),
arguing that the Commission’s price effects, adverse impact, and threat of material
injury analyses are unsupported by substantial evidence and otherwise not in
accordance with law. Pl. Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for J. on the Agency R., ECF Nos.
83–84, at 1 (May 12, 2025) (“Aluminum Br.”). The Commission requests that the
court sustain its determination. Def. Resp. in Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot. for J. on the
Agency R., ECF Nos. 88–89, at 1 (Aug. 11, 2025) (“ITC Br.”). Defendant-Intervenors
CEDAL Duran S.A., et al, (collectively, “Defendant-Intervenors”) likewise oppose
the U.S. Aluminum Extruder Coalition’s motion. Def.-Int. East Asia Aluminum Co.,
Ltd. Br. in Opp’n. to Pls.’ Mot. for J. on the Agency R., ECF No. 97, at 1 (Sep. 15,
2025) (“East Asia Aluminum Br.”); Def.-Int. CEDAL Suran S.A. et al Resp. Br. in
1 The Commission reached its negative determination by a majority vote. Commissioners David S.
Johanson and Jason E. Kearns issued the majority views, while Chair Amy A. Karpel dissented and would have reached an affirmative determination. Commissioner Rhonda K. Schmidtlein did not participate in the proceedings. Views at 3.
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Opp’n. to Pls.’ Mot. for J. on the Agency R., ECF No. 98–100, at 1 (Sep. 15, 2025)
(“DI Br.”).
For the reasons below, the court concludes that the Commission’s
determinations are supported by substantial evidence and otherwise lawful.
Accordingly, the court sustains the Commission’s determination in full.
BACKGROUND
On October 4, 2023, plaintiffs U.S. Aluminum Extruders Coalition and the
United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial
and Service Workers International Union (collectively, “plaintiffs”) filed petitions
with the Commission and the U.S. Department of Commerce (“Commerce”)
requesting antidumping and countervailing duty relief from imports of aluminum
extrusions from fourteen countries (the “subject countries”). Views at 3.2 The
Commission issued a final staff report on October 17, 2024. Memorandum from
Nannette Christ, Director, Office of Investigations, to the Commission, re:
Investigation Nos. 701-TA-695-698 and 731-TA-164-1644 and 1646-1657 (Final):
Aluminum Extrusions from China, Colombia, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Italy,
Malaysia, Mexico, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, United Arab Emirates
and Vietnam – Staff Report, P.R. 334, C.R. 885 (“Final Staff Report”). In its final
determination, the Commission determined that during the January 2021 to March
2 Unless otherwise indicated, citations to the Views refer to the confidential version. See Views,
C.R. 915 (Nov. 20, 2024).
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2024 period of investigation (“POI”), the U.S. domestic industry was neither
materially injured nor threatened with material injury by subject imports from
subject countries. Views at 3, 37.
Before the Commission, plaintiffs argued that throughout the POI, imports of
certain aluminum extrusions caused and threatened to cause material injury to the
domestic industry. See Aluminum Br. at 6. Specifically, plaintiffs presented
evidence that subject imports undersold the domestic like product and adversely
impacted the domestic industry. Id. at 8. Plaintiffs asserted that underselling –
rather than supply constraints – caused the financial and market share declines
that the domestic industry experienced throughout the POI. Id. at 9.
In the final phase of its investigations, the Commission performed an injury
analysis of subject imports. Views at 56; 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671d(b), 1673d(b). The
Commission considered how subject aluminum extruder imports affected the
domestic industry and whether there had been significant price underselling by the
imported goods. Views at 78. The Commission found that the volume of subject
imports, though significant, did not have significant price effects and was not
responsible for an adverse impact on the U.S. aluminum extrusions industry during
the POI. Views at 77. The Commission likewise found that “the pricing data show
predominant overselling by subject imports that generally increased in terms of
reported sales volume over the POI,” and thus determined the subject countries did
not significantly undersell in the domestic market. Id. at 81. The Commission
emphasized that subject import purchasers provided non-price reasons for
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purchasing imported rather than U.S.-produced products. Id. at 86. The final
determination acknowledged that pricing products may “provide relatively limited
coverage of U.S. shipments of subjected imports and the domestic product” because
aluminum extrusions are produced for purchasers in various shapes and sizes for
distinct applications. Id. at 79. Nevertheless, the Commission deemed the pricing
data probative of the relative prices in the U.S. aluminum extrusions market. Id. at
79–80.
The Commission further determined there was no adverse impact to the
domestic industry by reason of subject imports. Id. at 107. Although “many of the
domestic industry’s indicators declined over the POI,” the Commission found these
declines resulted from the industry’s supply constraints in 2021 and 2022 and the
decline in apparent U.S. consumption from 2022 to 2023, in the wake of COVID-19.
Id. at 92, 98. Thus, there was no “causal nexus between cumulated subject imports
and declines in the domestic industry’s performance during the POI.” Id. at 102.
Similarly, the Commission found that subject imports had no adverse impact on the
domestic industry in the first three months of 2024. Id. Although subject import
volume and market share rose at times throughout the POI, the Commission
concluded that such trends were not caused by underselling because the record
reflects predominant overselling. Id. Plaintiffs commenced this action to challenge
the Commission’s final determination, and the court heard oral argument on May 6,
2026.
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JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The court exercises jurisdiction pursuant to section 516A of the Tariff Act of
1930 (“the Act”), as amended, which authorizes judicial review of final
determinations by the Commission in antidumping and countervailing duty
investigations. See 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(i). The court reviews such
determinations under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c), which grants the court exclusive
jurisdiction over civil actions commenced under section 516A of the Act. See 28
U.S.C. § 1581(c).
The court sustains the Commission’s determinations, findings, and
conclusions unless they are “unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or
otherwise not in accordance with law.” 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i). Substantial
evidence refers to “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion,” and requires the court to consider the record as a
whole, including evidence that detracts from the agency’s determination. Universal
Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477, 488 (1951) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v.
NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). Although the court does not reweigh the evidence
or substitute its judgment for that of the Commission, the agency must provide a
reasoned explanation that permits the court to discern the path of its analysis and
ensures that it has considered the relevant evidence. See id.; Burlington Truck
Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962); Timken U.S. Corp. v. United
States, 421 F.3d 1350, 1354–57 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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Within this framework, the Commission may draw reasonable inferences
from the record and weigh conflicting evidence, and the court may not, “displace the
[Commission’s] choice between two fairly conflicting views, even though the court
would justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been before it
de
novo.” Universal Camera Corp., 340 U.S. at 488. The possibility of drawing “two
inconsistent conclusions” from the evidence, in other words, does not prevent the
Commission’s determination from being supported by substantial evidence. Nippon
Steel Corp. v. United States, 458 F.3d 1345, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2006). At the same
time, the Commission must base its determination on the record evidence and may
not rely on conjecture or disregard significant contrary evidence without
explanation. Id.
Furthermore, the Commission is “is presumed to have considered all of the
evidence on the record” and is “not required to explicitly address every piece of
evidence presented by the parties.” Nucor Corp. v. United States, 318 F. Supp. 2d
1207, 1247 (CIT 2004) (quoting USEC Inc. v. United States, 34 F. App’x 725, 730–31
(Fed. Cir. 2002)), aff’d, 414 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Instead, the Commission
need only address the issues that are material to its determination. Timken U.S.
Corp., 421 F.3d at 1354 (citing Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Statement of
Administrative Action, H.R. Rep. No. 103-316, vol. 1, at 892 (1994), reprinted in
1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4040 (“SAA”)).
Finally, when evaluating challenges to the Commission’s choice of
methodology, this court has explained that it will “affirm the chosen methodology as
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long as it is reasonable.” JMC Steel Grp. v. United States, 70 F. Supp. 3d 1309,
1316 n.4 (CIT 2015) (citing Shandong TTCA Biochem. Co., Ltd. v. United States,
774 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1327 (CIT 2011) (citations omitted)).
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
In the final phase of antidumping and countervailing duty investigations, the
Commission determines whether a domestic industry is materially injured or
threatened with material injury by reason of subject imports. 19 U.S.C.
§§ 1671d(b), 1673d(b). In reaching an injury determination, the Commission must
consider (i) the volume of subject imports, (ii) their effect on domestic prices, and
(iii) their impact on domestic producers in the context of domestic production
operations. Id. § 1677(7)(B). In assessing volume, the Commission determines
whether the volume of subject imports (or any increase in that volume), in either
absolute terms or relative to domestic production or consumption, is significant. Id.
§ 1677(7)(C)(i). With regard to price effects, the Commission considers whether
there has been significant price underselling by subject imports and whether
subject imports have significantly depressed domestic prices or prevented price
increases that otherwise would have occurred. Id. § 1677(7)(C)(ii). In assessing
impact on the domestic industry, the Commission considers all relevant economic
factors that bear on the state of the domestic industry, and no single factor is
dispositive. Id. § 1677(7)(C)(iii).
In making a threat determination, the Commission considers whether
“further dumped or subsidized imports are imminent and whether material injury
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by reason of imports would occur unless an order is issued or a suspension
agreement is accepted.” Id. § 1677(7)(F)(ii). The statute provides nine factors for
the Commission’s consideration, id. § 1677(7)(F)(i), and the Commission must
consider these factors “as a whole.” Id. § 1677(7)(F)(ii). Generally, the Commission
organizes its threat analysis using the same volume-price-impact framework that it
uses to assess material injury. See Views at 108 n.434.
Overall, the Commission’s statutory directive is to determine whether the
domestic industry is materially injured or threatened with material injury “by
reason of” subject imports. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671d(b), 1673d(b). Subject imports need
not be the main or predominant cause of material injury to the domestic industry;
rather, “[a]s long as its effects are not merely incidental, tangential, or trivial, the
foreign product sold at less than fair value meets the causation requirement.”
Nippon Steel Corp. v. USITC, 345 F.3d 1379, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2003). This causation
requirement remains consistent even where other economic factors besides subject
imports also have adverse effects on the domestic industry. See Taiwan
Semiconductor Indus. Ass’n v. USITC, 266 F.3d 1339, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (quoting
SAA at 852) (“[T]he Commission need not isolate the injury caused by other factors
from injury caused by unfair imports . . . Rather, the Commission must examine
other factors to ensure that it is not attributing injury from other sources to the
subject imports.”)).
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DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs challenge the Commission’s final negative determination in the
antidumping and countervailing duty investigations of aluminum extrusions from
China, Colombia, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Italy, Malaysia, Mexico, South Korea,
Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and Vietnam. See
Aluminum Br. at 4, 16–17. Plaintiffs argue that the Commission’s injury and
threat of injury analyses were flawed for several reasons, including both a flawed
price effects analysis and a flawed threat analysis. Id. at 4–5.
Nevertheless, because the Commission reasonably performed its price effects
analysis, adverse impact analysis, and threat analysis, the court concludes that the
Commission’s determination is supported by substantial evidence.
I. The commission reasonably performed its price effects analysis when
determining no material injury
Plaintiffs argue that subject imports undersold the domestic like product and
suppressed and depressed U.S. prices, and therefore the Commission’s negative
material injury determination warrants remand. Aluminum Br. at 16. The parties
do not dispute that the volume of subject imports was “significant” during the POI.
Id.at 17 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)(i)). Plaintiffs contend that the Commission
erred in concluding that this significant volume of subject imports did not result in
significant price effects for the domestic industry. Id. at 17 (citing Views at 77–78).
In determining whether subject imports have caused material injury, the
Commission “shall consider”: (i) the volume of imports of subject merchandise; (ii)
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the effect of imports of that merchandise on prices in the United States for domestic
like products (the “price effects analysis”); and (iii) the impact of such merchandise
on domestic producers of domestic like products (the “adverse impact analysis”).
19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(B)(i)(I)-(III).
To perform its price effects analysis, the Commission considers whether
“there has been significant price underselling by the imported merchandise as
compared with the price of domestic like products in the United States,” as well as
whether “the effect of imports of such merchandise otherwise depresses prices to a
significant degree or prevents price increases, which otherwise would have
occurred, to a significant degree.” Id. § 1677(7)(C)(ii)(I)–(II). Under substantial
evidence review, the court must affirm the Commission’s price effects determination
if it is reasonable and supported by “the record as a whole, even if some evidence
detracts from the Commission’s conclusion.” Hitachi Metals, Ltd. v. United States,
949 F.3d 710, 716 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
Here, the Commission’s underselling analysis is supported by substantial
evidence because the Commission reasonably (A) considered plaintiffs’ underselling
factor arguments; (B) considered the data before it; (C) recognized and explained the
limited nature of record data; (D) relied on pricing product data that were not
flawed; and (E) considered the record as a whole.
PPUBLIC VERSION
(A) The Commission reasonably analyzed the record as a whole when it
considered plaintiffs’ underselling arguments
Plaintiffs argue that the Commission’s underselling analysis “disregard[ed]
the clear weight of the evidence” by elevating “pricing product data above all else”
in determining that subject imports oversold the domestic like product during the
POI. Aluminum Br. at 20. In support of this argument, plaintiffs highlight eleven
factors in the record and argue that at least ten of those factors demonstrated
significant and injurious underselling (the “ten factors”). Id. at 18–19. Plaintiffs
likewise contend that the eleventh factor – pricing product data – also
demonstrated “pervasive underselling . . . in a market characterized by price
sensitivity and moderate-to-high substitutability.” Id. at 19 (citing Views at 69;
Staff Report at II-1). In sum, plaintiffs argue that not only did the Commission
unreasonably disregard “every other piece of record evidence” in favor of pricing
product comparisons, but it also incorrectly analyzed the pricing product data itself
in failing to find underselling. Id. at 20.
The Commission responds that plaintiffs do not challenge whether the
Commission considered the ten factors but instead ask the court to reweigh those
factors because they prefer a different outcome. ITC Br. at 20. The Commission
contends that it did not rely on a single data point; instead, the Commission
followed its traditional underselling methodology, which includes comparing
quarterly sales prices for representative pricing products reported by domestic
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producers and importers, as well as lost sales information. Id. at 20–21 (citations
omitted).
In determining that the record did not demonstrate significant underselling,
the Commission found that pricing data demonstrated pervasive and increasing
overselling, that there were “[[ ]]] numbers of confirmed lost sales, and that
非价格因素影响了采购决策。” 见 86。法院不
认为委员会“不当忽视”了这十项因素，
铝业简报第 20 页，因为委员会在其
裁定中处理了这些因素，并合理解释了为何该证据最终未能
压倒证明低价销售的其他证据。
下文，法院逐一分析原告援引的每项因素，以及
委员会对每项因素的回应：
(i) 因素一、六和九：销售和收入损失
因素一、六和九涉及以下证据：某些采购商认为
涉案进口产品价格较低，国内生产商报告因涉案进口产品
竞争而损失销售或降低价格，且生产商声称
遭受重大销售和收入损失。铝业简报第 19 页。原告将这些因素
概述如下：
(1) 多数采购商报告称涉案进口产品价格
低于美国挤压材。这是采购商就直接
在 POI 期间实际购买的涉案进口产品所作的直接报告。在 [[[ ]]]
家购买涉案进口产品而非美国挤压材的采购商中，
[[[ ]]]——包括 [[[ ]]]——报告称这些进口产品
价格低于美国挤压材。请愿人听证后简报第
4 页；请愿人最终评论第 5 页；工作人员报告第 V-47 页。
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. . .
(6) 美国生产商问卷同样证实，涉案进口产品
价格远低于美国挤压商价格，导致价格
抑制或压低：“在 31 家答复的美国生产商中，28 家
报告称他们不得不降低价格或撤回已宣布的
提价”以避免将销售输给涉案进口产品。同上第 7 页；工作人员
报告第 H-46 页（表 H-9）、H-47 页（表 H-9）、V-47 页。
. . .
(9) 美国生产商提交的重大销售和收入损失，
显示损失近 ]]]，证明了涉案进口产品
低价销售。同上第 8 页及注 45。
同上第 18–19 页。
上述每项因素均与委员会的销售损失分析相关，
委员会合理进行了该分析。在初步阶段，国内
生产商指认了 100 多家采购商，声称因涉案进口产品
而损失了销售或收入。最终工作人员报告第 V-47–
48 页。在最终阶段，委员会工作人员联系了采购商并获得了
有关其采购决策的答复。见 81–82。由此形成的
记录显示，55 家答复的采购商中有 36 家购买了或进口了
涉案商品而非国内生产的铝挤压材，且
其中 31 家采购报告称涉案进口产品价格较低。同上。但
只有 11 家采购商报告称价格是选择涉案
进口产品的主要原因。同上第 81 页。这 11 家采购商估计，在 POI 期间，
从涉案来源购买而非国内产品的铝
挤压材数量从 [[[ ]]] 短吨到 [[[ ]]] 短吨不等。最终工作人员
报告第 V-48 页。
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委员会合理认定，这些结果并未证明
在全行业范围内存在重大低价销售。首先，虽然
委员会确实认定“36 家购买涉案进口产品而非
国内同类产品的采购商中有 31 家”，但委员会合理解释称，
这一计数并不必然表明“涉案进口产品价格更低”。
见 82 注 329。正如委员会所阐述，这一计数仅表明
“that 31 purchasers indicated that they made a purchase when subject imports were
lower priced, but it does not indicate what fraction of their purchases were lower
priced.” Id. Underscoring this point, in the Final Staff Report, the Commission
found that only two of the responding 35 purchasers reported that U.S. producers
had reduced prices as a result of competing with lower priced imports, further
suggesting that underselling was unlikely. See Final Staff Report at V-48 (citing
tables V-18). The Commission therefore reasonably distinguished between evidence
that subject imports were lower priced in some transactions and evidence that lower
prices more broadly drove purchasers away from the domestic like product or
caused the domestic industry to lower its prices.
The Commission also did not disregard the producer questionnaire responses
that plaintiffs identify in Factor Six. See Views at 81. Domestic producers reported
allegations of lost sales, price reductions, and rolled-back price increases, and the
Commission took those allegations into consideration. See id. For starters, the
Commission considered that of 55 responding purchasers, 36 reported that since
January 1, 2021, they had purchased or imported aluminum extrusions from
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subject countries instead of domestic merchandise. Id. Of those purchasers, 31
reported the subject import price was lower than the domestic price, but only 11
reported price was the primary reason to purchase imported merchandise. Id. In
weighing these data points, the Commission considered that imported merchandise
made up only [[ ]]] percent of the reported purchases and imports of aluminum
extrusions from subject sources over the POI, id. at 81–82, and the fact that “only
two of 25 responding purchasers indicated that domestic producers had reduced
prices during the POI to compete with lower-priced subject imports.” Id. at 87.
Thus, the Commission did not reject the producers’ reports out of hand; rather, it
evaluated those reports against purchaser-specific evidence and other data collected
during the investigations to reach its conclusions.
Lastly, the Commission reasonably declined to treat petitioners’ claimed
[[ ]]] aggregate lost sales and revenues figure in Factor Nine as
dispositive. See Views at 85–86; Petitioners’ Post-Hearing Brief, P.R. 307, C.R.
814/842 at 7–8 n.45 (Oct. 9, 2024) (“Petitioners’ Post-Hearing Br.”). After contacting
over 50 of the purchasers that domestic producers had identified to investigate
these lost sales allegations, the Commission collected more particularized responses
regarding purchase decisions and pricing and ultimately determined that there
were not enough demonstrable lost sales for the Commission to find significant
negative price effects. Final Staff Report at V-47. The Commission then reasonably
decided to assign greater weight to this more particularized evidence that it
collected itself during the final phase than to petitioners’ initial claimed figure.
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See Views at 85–86. The court may not reweigh this evidence merely because
plaintiffs would draw a different conclusion. See Universal Camera Corp., 340 U.S.
at 477.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ arguments with regard to Factors One, Six, and Nine
do not demonstrate that the Commission ignored evidence of lower-priced subject
import or lot sales. Instead, these factors reflect evidence that the Commission
reasonably considered but ultimately found insufficient to demonstrate significant
underselling upon further investigation.
(ii) Factor Two: Purchasers’ Assessments of Relative Prices
Factor Two concerns purchasers’ general assessments that domestically
produced aluminum extrusions were higher-priced than subject imports from each
of the subject countries. Plaintiffs summarize that evidence as follows:
(2) U.S. purchasers also reported that U.S. extrusions were inferior in
price to (i.e., higher priced than) extrusions from all subject sources.
Petitioners’ Post-Hearing Br. at 5; Petitioners’ Final Comments at 5;
Prehearing Report at II-33, II-34–II-48 (Table II-15). Notably, U.S. and
subject extrusions were reported as comparable on all other factors, and
nonsubject import prices were comparable to U.S. prices. Petitioners’
Final Comments at 5-6; Staff Report at II-36–II-50 (Table II-15).
Aluminum Br. at 18.
The Commission reasonably considered this evidence and found that
quarterly pricing data was nevertheless more probative of relative prices than
purchasers’ subjective ratings. Views at 84. As the Commission explained, pricing
product data “are based on objective evidence of actual prices paid” and are specific
to each quarter of the POI, while purchaser responses only provide purchaser-
PPUBLIC VERSION
specific information about pricing. Id. Thus, the Commission did not disregard the
purchaser responses that plaintiffs cite in Factor Two; rather, the Commission
reasonably found objective pricing data more illustrative of trends over the POI
than purchasers’ subjective ratings of relative price levels. Id. Plaintiffs’
disagreement with that assessment does not establish that the Commission’s
determination was unreasonable.
(iii) Factor Three: Purchase-Cost Analysis
Factor Three concerns petitioners’ purchase-cost analysis, which plaintiffs
argue demonstrated widespread underselling even after accounting for the
additional costs associated with imported merchandise. Plaintiffs summarize that
evidence as follows:
(3) Plaintiffs prepared a purchase cost data analysis for importers with
reported pricing products covering all U.S. shipments. Even adjusted to
account for additional costs related to importing, that analysis showed
subject import underselling in [[[ ]]].
Petitioners’ Post-Hearing Br. at 5 and Exhibit 37.
Aluminum Br. at 18.
The Commission specifically acknowledged plaintiffs’ proposed purchase-cost
data analysis and reasonably explained that it did “not find these yearly [average
unit value] data probative given the limited quantities involved and changes in
prices over the POI.” Views at 81 n.324. The Commission also explained that it
was “unclear the extent to which importers imported aluminum extrusions for their
own use” and noted the “additional burden such data collection would impose on
importers.” Id. at 80 n.319. Thus, the Commission addressed plaintiffs’ proposed
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purchase-cost data analysis and reasonably explained why this data was less
reliable than the pricing product data it used.
(iv) Factor Four: Average Unit Values
Factor Four concerns petitioners’ reliance on average unit value (“AUV”)
data, which in their view demonstrated that subject imports consistently undersold
the domestic like product. Plaintiffs summarize that evidence as follows:
(4) Subject import average unit values (“AUV”) were [[[ ]]] lower,
[[[ ]]] lower, and [[[ ]]] lower than U.S. producer AUVs in 2021, 2022,
and 2023, respectively, and [[[ ]]] lower in interim 2024. Id.; Prehearing
Report at C-1–C-5 (Table C-1). Indeed, new, product specific AUV data
in the final staff report showed that, in [[[ ]]] of available comparisons,
subject imports were priced lower than U.S. product for crash relevant
extrusions, extrusions for window wall units, extrusions for heat
exchangers, and all other types of extrusions. Petitioners’ Final
Comments at 6; Staff Report at M-3–M-6 (Figures M-1– M-4).
Aluminum Br. at 18.
The Commission did, in fact, consider subject import AUVs, and it reasonably
assigned relatively limited weight to those data compared to other record evidence.
As the Commission explained, AUVs “are based on approximations of the value of
the aluminum extrusions in annual shipments of window wall units and heat
exchangers” – and are therefore “influenced by differences in product mix and
changes in product mix over time.” Views at 85.3 Contrary to plaintiffs’ assertions,
3 As this court and the Federal Circuit have previously recognized, while AUV data can provide
useful contextual information, such data are generally less probative where the merchandise at issue encompasses a relatively broad range of product types. Under these circumstances, differences in average unit values may reflect differences in product mix rather than differences in the prices charged for comparable products. See Allegheny Ludlum Corp. v. United States, 287 F.3d 1365, 1373–74 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Nucor Corp. v. United States, 594 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1363 (CIT 2008).
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the Commission did not “disregard” the AUV data; rather, it reasonably concluded
that quarterly pricing-product data, which compare actual transaction prices for
defined products, provided a more reliable measure of relative pricing. See id.
(v) Factor Five: Contemporaneous Documentary Evidence
Factor Five concerns contemporaneous reports and other documentary
evidence that, in plaintiffs’ view, demonstrate significant underselling by subject
imports. Plaintiffs summarize that evidence below:
(5) Petitioners presented a uniquely significant amount of
contemporaneous, documented evidence showing that customers
frequently and specifically informed U.S. producers that subject imports
were priced lower than their U.S. extrusion prices. See Petitioners’ Post-
Hearing Br. at 5–7 (detailing sixteen specific reports from actual
purchasers).
Aluminum Br. at 18–19.
The Commission considered this contemporaneous documentary evidence and
reasonably explained why it did not alter its finding of predominant overselling.
See Views at 85–86 n.339. Here, plaintiffs argue that the Commission disregarded
sixteen purchaser reports identified in Petitioners’ Pre-Hearing Brief. See
Petitioners’ Prehearing Brief, P.R. 267, C.R. 789/797 at 73–74 (Sep. 25, 2024)
(“Petitioners’ Prehearing Br.”). The record, however, reflects that the Commission
adequately addressed the substance of such evidence. See Views at 85–86 n.339.
For instance, the Commission explicitly discussed Exhibit 19 of Petitioners’ Pre-
Hearing Brief, which [[
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]]]. Id. After analyzing this exhibit,
the Commission found that it was ultimately less persuasive than pricing product
data, because the exhibit itself [[[
]]]] – and
therefore it was a later-created description of pricing rather than an actual,
contemporaneous record of communication with purchasers. Id. (citing Petitioners’
Pre-Hearing Br. at 73–74). Likewise, the Commission addressed Exhibit 22 of
Petitioners’ Pre-Hearing Brief and explained that the exhibit consisted primarily of
a request and provision of a quote [[[
]]] – rather than
contemporaneous evidence of underselling transactions or specific lost sales. Id.
These examples demonstrate that the Commission considered the documentary
evidence upon which plaintiffs rely and explained why it did not find that evidence
dispositive.
The fact that the Commission cited to petitioners’ pre-hearing brief rather
than the later post-hearing brief – which plaintiffs point to as evidence that the
Commission overlooked certain documents – likewise does not demonstrate that the
Commission failed to consider any underlying evidence. See Aluminum Br. at 22
(citing Petitioners’ Post-Hearing Br. at Exs. 3, 26). Indeed, Petitioners’ Pre-Hearing
Brief relied on many of the same reports and exhibits identified in petitioners’ post-
hearing submission, further indicating that the Commission was addressing the
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substance of the evidence regardless of which particular brief it cited. See Views at
85 (citing Petitioners’ Pre-Hearing Br. at 73–74 and Exs. 19–25); see also
Petitioners’ Post-Hearing Br. at Exs. 3–26.
The Commission’s broader explanation of petitioners’ documentary evidence
was sufficient to demonstrate that it considered such evidence as a whole and
reasonably found that it did not establish significant underselling. See Views at
85–86. Although the Commission did not separately address each of the sixteen
reports identified in Petitioners’ Pre-Hearing Brief, it was not required to do so.
Rather, absent a showing to the contrary, “the ITC is presumed to have considered
all of the evidence on the record.” Aluminum Extrusions Fair Trade Comm. v.
United States, 36 CIT 1370, 1373 (2012). Because plaintiffs have not overcome that
presumption here, substantial evidence supports the Commission’s consideration of
the contemporary documentary evidence on the record as well as the Commission’s
determination that such evidence does not demonstrate significant underselling by
subject imports.
(vi) Factor Seven: Purchaser Testimony
Factor Seven concerns additional purchaser statements and testimony that,
in plaintiffs’ view, demonstrate significant underselling and pricing pressure.
Plaintiffs describe this evidence as follows:
(7) Significant testimony at the Staff Conference and Hearing confirmed
the extremely and unfairly low pricing of subject imports. Petitioners’
Post-Hearing Br. at 7 n.40 (collecting relevant cites).
Aluminum Br. at 19.
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The Commission considered this testimonial evidence and reasonably
explained why it did not alter its overall pricing analysis or support a finding of
underselling by subject imports. The Commission explicitly acknowledged that
“purchasers generally indicated that subject imports are lower-priced than the
domestic like product” and that “most responding purchasers reported that subject
imports were lower priced.” Views at 84. Despite such evidence, nevertheless, the
Commission found that the more reliable evidence consisted of verified quarterly
pricing data comparing specific products and transactions over time. Id. As the
Commission explained, “the pricing product data are based on objective evidence of
actual prices paid, and are specific to each quarter of the POI” – whereas
“purchasers’ subjective ratings of relative price levels do not illustrate trends over
the POI.” Id.
Nor was the Commission required to discuss each individual purchaser
statement or testimony that plaintiffs identify. Rather, the Commission was
required to consider the record as a whole, including any material evidence that
detracts from its conclusions, and explain its reasoning sufficiently. Here, the
Commission did so by acknowledging petitioners’ arguments regarding purchaser
testimony, evaluating material testimonial evidence, and reasonably explaining
why that evidence did not establish significant underselling.
(vii) Factor Eight: Dumping Margins
Factor Eight involves the significant dumping margins that Commerce
calculated in its determination, which in plaintiffs’ view corroborate the existence of
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significant underselling by subject imports. Plaintiffs summarize that evidence as
follows:
(8) Commerce found nearly all subject country imports to be dumped, at
margins up to 605%. [Petitioners’ Post-Hearing Br.] at 8 & n.44.
Aluminum Br. at 19.
The Commission, however, reasonably considered the antidumping
determination and dumping margins that Commerce calculated and explained why
it did not find them dispositive for purposes of the Commission’s price effects
analysis. As the Commission recognized, Commerce’s dumping calculations serve a
different statutory purpose and are based upon a different methodology than the
Commission’s inquiry into whether subject imports significantly undersold the
domestic like product during the POI. Views at 91–92 n.365. Rather than
disregard Commerce’s dumping determination, the Commission explicitly took into
account that Commerce had found “that subject producers in all subject countries
[were] selling subject imports at less than fair value” during the relevant period. Id.
After considering Commerce’s findings alongside other record evidence, however,
the Commission reasonably explained that it found the latter – especially pricing
product comparisons – more probative under its independent statutory analysis. Id.
The court may not reweigh this evidence or substitute its judgment for the
Commission’s. See Universal Camera Corp., 340 U.S. at 477.
(viii) Factor Ten: Preliminary Pricing Data
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Factor Ten concerns plaintiffs’ contention that the preliminary-phase pricing
data corroborated its underselling claims and that the Commission erred by relying
on the revised final-phase pricing data instead. Plaintiffs describe that evidence as
follows:
(10) Reliable data from the preliminary phase showed “subject imports
predominantly undersold the domestic product by volume in each year
of the POI.” Id. at 7; USITC Pub. 5477 at 63.
Aluminum Br. at 19.
Here, the court concludes that it was reasonable for the Commission to rely
more heavily on pricing data from the final phase of the investigations than on less
comprehensive pricing data collected during the preliminary phase. See Final Staff
Report at V-7–8 n.6 (noting that final phase pricing data from [[[ ]]] importers
were either removed or adjusted); 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(a)(2). Specifically, the
Commission explained why differences in the two datasets limited the utility of
referencing to the preliminary dataset in tandem with data collected in the final
phase:
The Commission has on occasion utilized questionnaire data from the
preliminary phase of the investigations, but unlike in the preliminary
phase of the investigations, the importers’ questionnaire in the final
phase of the investigations instructed importers to include
transportation costs to the United States in their reported prices when
the U.S. sales are valued on an ex works basis in the country of export.
Views at 83 n.333. Given this methodological difference, the Commission
reasonably determined that the final phase pricing data provided a more complete
and reliable basis to evaluate underselling.
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(ix) Factor Eleven: Final Phase Pricing Product Data
Finally, Factor Eleven concerns plaintiffs’ contention that the Commission
erred in its analysis of the final phase pricing product data itself. More specifically,
plaintiffs argue that the Commission “failed to explain why subject import
underselling in 39.1% of available pricing comparisons was not indicative of adverse
price effects, even though the Commission has recognized in other instances that
underselling does not need to occur in the majority of occurrences in order for it to
be injurious.” Aluminum Br. at 20 (citing Views at 80).
The court disagrees. The Commission did not simply conclude that adverse
price effects were absent because subject imports undersold the domestic like
product in fewer than half of pricing product comparisons. See Views at 80.
Rather, the Commission comprehensively evaluated the frequency of underselling
together with the magnitude of underselling, the prevalence of overselling, the
relative importance of non-price factors to purchaser sourcing decisions, the limited
evidence of confirmed lost sales, and the evidence of domestic supply constraints,
among other record evidence. Id. In light of that much broader context, the
Commission reasonably concluded that the level of underselling that it found was
not sufficient to establish significant adverse price effects.
* * *
In sum, the Commission considered and reasonably addressed each of the
factors that plaintiffs point to as evidence of significant underselling. The question
before this court is not whether it might weigh each factor differently or reach a
PPUBLIC VERSION
different conclusion based on the same evidence, but instead whether the
Commission reasonably considered the record before it and explained its reasoning.
The court concludes that it did.
(B) The Commission reasonably relied upon other record evidence
Plaintiffs argue that the Commission also failed to mention or reasonably
analyze certain “other record evidence” in addition to the eleven factors discussed
above. Aluminum Br. at 21 (citing Views at 85–86). Plaintiffs refer, for instance, to
evidence that a “[[[
]]], as well as a [[[
]]” as examples of “other record evidence” that the Commission
purportedly failed to consider in reaching its conclusion that subject imports did not
significantly undersell the domestic like product. Id. at 22 (citing Petitioners’ Post-
Hearing Br. at Exs. 3, 26). Plaintiffs argue that the Commission either failed to
consider this additional record evidence, or, where the Commission did consider it,
failed to appreciate that its analysis should have resulted in the opposite
conclusion. See id.
The Commission must consider the record “as a whole” in determining
whether subject imports injure the domestic industry and domestic producers.
Hitachi Metals, Ltd., 949 F.3d at 716. Here, the fact that the Commission did not
specifically name or independently analyze each individual exhibit does not
undermine its overarching conclusion that the record as a whole does not
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products’—and even so, ‘not all firms reported pricing for all products
for all quarters.’
Aluminum Br. at 23 (citing Views at 78–79). In short, plaintiffs contend that the
quarterly pricing data covered too little of the market to support conclusions about
the pricing behavior of subject imports generally.
然而，委员会并未忽视数据集的覆盖范围，并且
合理地认定季度定价数据具有足够的代表性和
可靠性，足以支持其价格效应分析。尽管委员会承认
季度定价数据相对有限，但委员会解释说，
它预计“定价产品对涉案进口产品和国内产品的美国出货量
所提供的覆盖范围相对有限。” Views at 79。
委员会还合理地解释说，更广泛的覆盖范围难以获得，
因为铝挤压材是按购买者订单生产的，并且有“
多种形状和尺寸，用于许多不同应用”——这确保
任何一组定义的定价产品都可能只占市场的有限份额。
Id. at 79–80.4 委员会进一步阐述，即使
数据有限，委员会也精心开发数据以提供“同类
价格比较”。 Id. at 79–80。最后，委员会还指出，
4 正如委员会所指出的，本法院此前曾裁定，委员会“不因
定价数据未涵盖整个市场甚至大部分市场而被禁止
依赖现有定价数据。” ITC Br. at 14–15（引用 Altx, Inc. v. United States, 26 CIT 709, 720–21 (2002)）。事实上，本法院已认识到，“[抽]样，如同取平均值，是一种必要的统计技术，没有它，委员会的任务将几乎不可能完成。” ITC Br. at 15（引用 U.S. Steel Grp., 96 F.3d at 1366）。
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请愿人自己此前曾表示“定价产品
提供了足够的覆盖范围和代表铝挤压材
市场的数据”， id. at 80，而现在才提出相反主张。鉴于上述所有情况，
法院得出结论，委员会合理地认定季度
定价数据在覆盖范围和代表性方面足以适当进行
其价格效应分析。
(D) 委员会并未依赖“有缺陷的”定价产品数据
原告主张，委员会的定价产品数据“有缺陷”，
主要有两个原因。首先，原告声称委员会的定价
产品数据不当比较了不同贸易环节的产品。 Aluminum
Br. at 24。其次，原告声称定价产品数据集本身
不可靠，因为委员会排除了某些初步阶段数据，同时
接受了一家特定进口商迟交的修订问卷。 Id.
关于贸易环节，原告特别主张，委员会的
定价产品比较不可靠，因为某些进口商报告了
下游物品的销售，其贸易环节与所比较的国内产品
不同。 Id. 据原告称，这些销售并未
提供同类产品的同类比较，因为下游贸易环节的价格
可能包含额外加工、服务或其他
价值，而这些在供应链更上游的销售中并不同样存在。 Id. 原告进一步主张，尽管他们在行政程序期间
指出了此类下游销售报告的具体实例，
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委员会却以结论性方式回应称定价数据不包含
贸易环节差异，而未充分处理相反的记录
evidence or removing the challenged sales from its pricing product comparisons. Id.
The Commission disputes plaintiffs’ contentions. ITC Br. at 82–83. Further,
Defendant-Intervenors respond that plaintiffs have not substantiated their claim
that downstream articles and products sold at different levels of trade were
improperly included in the pricing-product data. DI Br. at 13 (citing Aluminum Br.
at 24). In Defendant-Intervenors’ view, the Commission’s response to plaintiffs’
levels-of-trade concerns was reasonable because the Commission staff investigated
the identified responses, contacted the relevant firms, and either confirmed that the
data had been correctly reported or obtained corrections where necessary. DI Br. at
13. Defendant-Intervenors therefore contend that purported level-of-trade errors
provide no basis for discounting the pricing-product data. DI Br. at 13.
The court concludes that the Commission considered and reasonably
disregarded the plaintiffs’ levels-of-trade argument. See Views at 83. The
Commission specifically responded to petitioners’ case briefing, in which petitioners
argued that an importer had “reported pricing data [[
]]].” Views at 83 n.332 (citing Petitioners’ Pre-
Hearing Br. at 80). In response to this contention, the Commission explained that it
PPUBLIC VERSION
was “unpersuaded by Petitioners’ arguments that pricing data should be
disregarded in these investigations” and that “Commission staff confirmed that
pricing data do not include data for products not matching the pricing products or
prices derived from sales of downstream products that contain aluminum
extrusions.” Views at 83. In short, the Commission did not overlook plaintiff’s
levels-of-trade concerns. The Commission investigated them, verified the relevant
reporting, and reasonably concluded that the pricing-product data were not
distorted in the manner alleged.
Beyond the levels-of-trade issue, plaintiffs argue that the Commission’s
pricing product data is flawed because the Commission excluded certain
preliminary phase pricing data while accepting a late-stage revision to an
importer’s final-phase questionnaire response. Aluminum Br. at 24. First,
plaintiffs contend that the Commission improperly omitted pricing product data
submitted during the preliminary phase by importers that did not respond during
the final phase. Id. at 24. Plaintiffs maintain that inclusion of preliminary-phase
responses would have produced a dataset showing majority underselling by volume.
Id.at 24. Second, plaintiffs challenge the Commission’s acceptance of an importer’s
unsolicited revision to its pricing product data shortly before the close of the
administrative record, arguing that this “eleventh hour” revision transformed the
quarterly price comparisons from majority underselling to majority underselling.
Id.at 24–25. According to plaintiffs, the fact that “one importer [[
]]” could materially alter the outcome of the
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Commission’s underselling analysis demonstrates the inherent limitations of the
pricing product dataset. Id.at 25 (citing Petitioners’ Final Comments, P.R. 341, C.R.
909/911 at 7–8 (Oct. 25, 2024) (“Petitioners’ Final Comments”)).
In response, Defendant-Intervenors argue that the Commission reasonably
declined to incorporate preliminary-phase pricing data into the final dataset
because the two datasets were not directly comparable. The Defendant-Intervenors
point out that “the instructions for reporting import pricing values for ex-works
sales had changed from the preliminary to final-phase questionnaires” – and
therefore “any reported data pulled forward from the preliminary investigations
would
inherently be distorted by the exclusion of transportation costs in ex-works
sales.” DI Br. at 11-12 (citing Views at 63 n.333). Defendant-Intervenors further
contend that the Commission properly accepted the relevant importer’s revision
because the importer identified a specific mistake – reporting sales under the
closest product category even when the merchandise did not satisfy that category’s
definition – and submitted “clear and specific” corrections before the administrative
record closed. Id. In sum, Defendant-Intervenors argue that the Commission
reasonably excluded data collected under an incomparable methodology and
accepted a timely correction designed to remove inaccurately reported sales.
The Commission likewise contends that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that
the pricing product data were unrepresentative. ITC Br. at 19. In particular, the
Commission argues that plaintiffs identify “[no] quantitative evidence” indicating
that the pricing product data were unrepresentative of the overall market. Id.
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(citing U.S. Steel Grp., 96 F.3d at 1366 (holding that “[g]eneral allegations . . . are
insufficient” to demonstrate that a data sample is unrepresentative)). The
Commission therefore maintains that plaintiffs’ criticism amounts to disagreement
with the Commission’s weighing of the evidence, rather than a showing that the
pricing product data were legally insufficient to support the Commission’s
determination. Id.
Here, the court concludes that neither the Commission’s exclusion of the
preliminary-phase pricing data nor its acceptance of an importer’s revised final-
phase response undermines its determination. The Commission reasonably
declined to incorporate the preliminary-phase data because the reporting
instructions had changed between the preliminary and final investigations, such
that the preliminary responses did not account for transportation costs in the same
manner as the final-phase responses. Views at 83 n.333. The Commission also
reasonably permitted the importer to revise its response before the administrative
record closed, and the fact that the Commission relied on such data does not reflect
negatively upon the Commission’s determination – especially where the
Commission acknowledged the revision and explained its decision to consider the
revised data. Id. at 83–84 n.334.5 In sum, the Commission reasonably relied upon
the final dataset, because the Commission reasonably determined that the dataset
5 In its Views, the Commission explains its decision to accept the revised data in spite of petitioners’
timing-based objections, and further notes that the Commission staff “continued to verify that data are correct after the staff report issued.” Views at 83–84 n.334.
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excluded certain incomparable preliminary data and incorporated a substantiated
and timely correction.
(E) The Commission lawfully considered the record as a whole and reasonably
considered any detracting evidence
Plaintiffs argue that the Commission failed to consider the record as a whole,
as required by DAK Americas LLC v. United States, because it elevated quarterly
pricing data above other evidence that, in plaintiffs’ view, demonstrated significant
underselling. Aluminum Br. at 26 (citing 456 F. Supp. 3d 1340, 1367 (CIT 2020)
(“DAK I”)). According to plaintiffs, the Commission violated the requirements of
DAK I by “disregarding . . . probative evidence” while requirements weighed pricing
product data. Aluminum Br. at 20. Specifically, plaintiffs contend:
[A] lawful consideration of the record as a whole necessarily should have
included a meaningful acknowledgment of [the pricing product data’s]
limitations, the fact that even that belatedly adjusted data set indicated
substantial underselling, and the fact that every other piece of record
data demonstrated underselling to a significant and injurious degree.
Id. at 26.
In response, the Commission argues that DAK I is not instructive here
because the Commission considered the record as a whole and reasonably
considered evidence that, in plaintiffs’ view, detracted from its conclusion. Id. at
31–32. According to the Commission, the latter case DAK Americas LLC v. United
States (“DAK II”) is more instructive than its predecessor DAK I, because in the
latter case, the court sustained the Commission’s determination on remand after
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concluding that the Commission had adequately addressed potentially conflicting
record evidence. ITC Br. at 31–32 (citing 517 F. Supp. 3d 1349, 1357 (CIT 2021)).
Both DAK I and DAK II apply the same basic substantial evidence principle
that the Commission must sufficiently address detracting evidence when conducting
an injury determination. In DAK I, this court remanded the Commission’s
underselling analysis because the Commission unreasonably relied on flawed
pricing data and failed to adequately address evidence that detracted from its
conclusion. See DAK I, 456 F. Supp. 3d at 1353, 1357–1358. In DAK II, by
contrast, this court sustained the Commission’s underselling determination – which
was based upon the same underlying pricing data – because this time, the
Commission supplied the missing explanation of potentially detracting evidence.
DAK II, 517 F. Supp. at 1356–1357. Thus, the distinction between the two
decisions is not whether detracting evidence existed, but instead whether the
Commission considered and reasonably explained its treatment of that evidence.
See id. at 1362.
Here, the court concludes that the Commission satisfied its legal obligation to
consider the record as a whole and address detracting evidence. Unlike in DAK I,
the Commission did not simply rely on the quarterly pricing comparisons while
leaving potentially contrary evidence unexplained. See, e.g., Views at 84–91.
Rather, much like in DAK II, the Commission reasonably explained why the data it
relied upon were sufficient and considered enough of the record evidence to
withstand substantial evidence review. See id. More specifically, the Commission
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acknowledged the limitations of its quarterly pricing comparisons, explained why it
nevertheless considered them the most probative direct evidence of relative prices,
id. at 79–80, and separately considered and addressed the other evidence upon
which plaintiffs rely, including purchaser perceptions, average unit value data, lost
sales allegations, the purchase-cost analysis, and preliminary-phase pricing data,
see id. at 84–91. Moreover, the Commission’s approach was consistent with its
“well-established practice” of focusing its “underselling analysis on a comparison of
the number of instances of underselling to the number of instances of overselling as
reflected in the quarterly pricing data.” DAK II, 517 F. Supp. at 1357. This case
therefore more closely resembles DAK II than DAK I: the Commission considered
the record as a whole, confronted detracting evidence, and explained why that
evidence did not outweigh the quarterly pricing comparisons and other data points
supporting its finding that there was no significant underselling during the POI.
II. The Commission reasonably performed its adverse impact analysis
Plaintiffs argue that the Commission erred in determining that subject
imports did not adversely impact the domestic industry. Aluminum Br. at 16–17.
The Commission responds that its adverse impact determination is reasonable and
in accordance with law because the record does not establish that subject imports
caused the domestic industry’s declines in performance and instead demonstrates
that those declines resulted from supply constraints and weaker demand. ITC Br.
at 33.
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In assessing impacts on the domestic industry, the Commission “shall
evaluate all relevant economic factors which have a bearing on the state of the
industry.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)(iii). The Commission evaluates “all relevant
economic factors . . . within the context of the business cycle and conditions of
competition that are distinctive to the affected industry.” Id. These factors include
output, market share, capacity utilization, inventories, employment, wages, growth,
and factors affecting domestic prices. Id. § 1677(7)(C)(iii)(I–V).
The Commission reasonably performed its adverse impact analysis because
(A) the Commission’s reliance on domestic supply constraints is supported by
substantial evidence; (B) the Commission reasonably explained that certain
specified “other evidence” does not independently support an affirmative adverse
impact determination; and (C) the Commission’s underselling determination is not
erroneous and therefore does not require remand on adverse impact.
(A) The Commission’s analysis of and reliance on domestic supply constraints
data is supported by substantial evidence
Plaintiffs argue that the Commission’s supply constraints analysis is not
supported by substantial evidence and “arbitrarily depart[s] from relevant agency
precedents.” Aluminum Br. at 33 (referencing Brass Rod from India, Inv. No. 701-
TA-686, USITC Pub. 5485 (Feb. 2024) (Final); Truck & Bus Tires from Thailand,
Inv. No. 731-TA-1658, USITC Pub. 5562 (Dec. 2024) (Final); Certain Mobile Access
Equipment & Subassemblies Thereof from China, Inv. No. 701-TA-665, USITC Pub.
5242 (Dec. 2021) (Final)). In plaintiffs’ view, the Commission’s finding that subject
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imports increased during the first half of 2022, id. (citing Views at 112 n.447), is
consistent with petitioners’ data-based submission during the administrative
proceedings that subject imports were higher in the second half of 2022 than in the
first, id. (citing Petitioners’ Post-Hearing Br. at 46). Plaintiffs also point out that
subject imports “gained the most market share at the domestic industry’s expense
in interim 2024,” by which time the domestic industry no longer faced supply
constraints. Id. (citing Petitioners’ Final Comments at 9–13). According to
plaintiffs, these errors and inconsistencies prove that the Commission’s supply
constraints analysis lacked substantial evidentiary support. Id.
Contrary to the plaintiffs’ arguments, however, the Commission’s supply
constraints analysis is supported by substantial evidence. See Views at 112. As an
initial matter, the Commission’s findings are entirely consistent with the 2022 data
that petitioners presented during the administrative proceedings: the
Commission’s observation that subject imports increased in the first half of 2022
does not conflict with petitioners’ submission that subject imports were higher
during the second half of the year. See Views at 112; Aluminum Br. at 33.
More broadly, the Commission reasonably explained why it found that supply
constraints significantly affected the domestic industry’s ability to supply the U.S.
market, which forced purchasers to buy subject imports instead. Views at 99. The
Commission considered record data indicating that four of the five largest domestic
producers, which accounted for more than [[ ]]] of the industry’s sales by quantity
in 2023, reported supply constraints in 2021 and 2022. See id. (citing U.S.
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Producers’ Questionnaires, C.R. 319–23, 339–47, at IV-18 (ITC Oct. 2023)). The
largest domestic producer, which accounted for over [[ ]]] of the industry’s
sales in 2023, reported that [[
]], and further reported
that [[ ]]]. See
id. at IV–8(b), IV–18.
The Commission’s adverse impact determination is also supported by
substantial evidence because the Commission reasonably relied on U.S. purchaser
responses demonstrating that domestic producers were often unable to supply
requested aluminum extrusions. In the Views, the Commission notes that domestic
producers were in several instances “unable or unwilling to supply aluminum
extrusions, placed them on allocation, or had unacceptable lead times.” Views at
100. The Commission likewise considered evidence that most large purchasers of
domestically produced aluminum extrusions reported supply constraints, nine of
which accounted for over [[ ]]] of the [[ ]]] short tons of
reported purchases of the domestic like product. Views at 100–01; see CR/PR at
Table V-15 (showing purchasers and volumes purchased). Although the
Commission acknowledged that some purchasers reported supply constraints
among importers, it ultimately determined that supply constraints were more
prevalent amongst domestic producers. Views at 101; see CR/PR at Table II-4;
CR/PR at Table II-12. Taken together, this evidence reasonably supported the
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Commission’s conclusion that the domestic industry’s declining performance
resulted from its own supply limitations, rather than from subject imports.
Plaintiffs’ arguments based on prior Commission determinations are also
misplaced, because the Commission reasonably explained that the present
investigations involved materially different facts and economic circumstances. For
instance, while plaintiffs point to Brass Rod from India as evidence that supply
constraints do not necessarily preclude a finding of adverse impact, the nature and
timing of the supply constraints were different materially between the two
investigations. See Aluminum Br. at 30. In Brass Rod from India the domestic
industry’s COVID-related supply constraints had largely abated by 2022. See Brass
Rod from India at 57. Here, by contrast, the Commission found that the domestic
aluminum extrusion industry continued to experience supply constraints through
2022. See Views at 99. Given this difference, the Commission reasonably concluded
that Brass Rod from India does not compel a different result in this case.
Finally, contrary to plaintiffs’ contention that the Commission’s analysis is
inconsistent with interim-period market share data and lead-time information, the
Commission reasonably grounded its conclusions in the record. With respect to
interim period market share, the Commission reasonably determined that the
increase in subject import market share from interim 2023 to interim 2024 did not
establish injurious price effects. See id. at 112–13. Although subject imports
gained market share in this interim comparison, the Commission reasonably found
that the record does not demonstrate that the increase was driven by subject import
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underselling. Id. Rather, subject imports oversold the domestic like product in 13
of 21 quarterly comparisons corresponding to 80.8 percent of reported subject
import sales volume in interim 2024, and the record further reflected both the
importance of non-price factors in purchasing decisions and the scarcity of
confirmed lost sales due to price. Id. at 102–03; see CR/PR at Table V-14 (revised
by INV-WW-135). With respect to lead times, the Commission relied upon data
showing that most domestic producers and purchasers reported a change in lead
times in 2021 and 2022. Views at 99–100; see CR/PR at Table II-12. But because
the record indicates that demand for aluminum extrusions is seasonal, the
Commission reasonably declined to compare data between the first and second
halves of 2022, concluding that such comparisons would not reliably measure
whether supply constraints had eased. Views at 90; see CR/PR at II-5 and II-18.
In sum, given the considerable record evidence that the largest domestic
producers and purchasers faced supply constraints and extended lead times, the
limited evidence that importers faced similar supply constraints or extended lead
times, and the Commission’s thorough explanation of each, the Commission’s
analysis is supported by substantial evidence.
(B) The Commission reasonably explained that the domestic industry was not
impacted “by reason of” subject imports
Plaintiffs argue that even if supply constraints contributed to the domestic
industry’s declining performance, the domestic industry was still adversely
impacted “by reason of” subject imports. Aluminum Br. at 33. Plaintiffs note that,
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under established case law, subject imports “need not be the sole or principal cause
of injury.” Id. at 33 (quoting Nippon Steel Corp., 345 F.3d at 1381). Instead, “as
long as the injuring action’s effects are not merely incidental, tangential or trivial,
the foreign product sold at less than fair value meets the causation requirement.”
Id. (quoting Nippon Steel Corp., 345 F.3d at 1381). Connecting this causation
requirement to the facts of this case, plaintiffs highlight that while supply
constraints eased in 2023, the domestic industry nevertheless failed to gain back
any of the market share it lost in 2022, and capacity utilization rates steadily
declined over the POI. Id. at 34. In response, the Commission contends that it
considered all such evidence and reasonably determined that it does not warrant a
finding of causation. ITC Br. at 36.
The court concludes that the Commission reasonably determined that supply
constraints from 2021 to 2022 and a decline in apparent U.S. consumption from
2022 to 2023 explain the decline in domestic producers’ output and financial
performance. See Views at 102–104. Relying on hearing witness testimony, the
Commission explained that for the domestic industry, locating qualified suppliers is
often a time-consuming and expensive process, and switching back and forth
between suppliers can involve “extreme cost” and prove “cost-prohibitive.” Id. at
103 n.423. Given the time-intensive nature of finding and replacing suppliers, the
Commission explained that “[one] would not have expected the industry to rapidly
regain market share” lost in 2022, “even after the domestic industry’s supply
constraints eased.” Id. at 103. In short, the Commission considered the relevant
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record evidence regarding supplier cost and replacement and reasonably concluded
that supply constraints – rather than subject imports – caused the domestic
industry’s performance declines during the POI.
(C) The Commission’s underselling determination is not erroneous and does not
require remand of the Commission’s adverse impact determination
Plaintiffs argue that because the Commission’s underselling analysis itself
was erroneous, and because the Commission’s underselling determination
underpins its adverse impact analysis, the court must therefore remand the
Commission’s determination on adverse impact. Aluminum Br. at 32 (citing DAK I,
456 F. Supp. 3d at 1349 (remanding an adverse impact determination which relied
on an erroneous underselling determination)). The Commission responds that its
underselling finding was reasonable, and therefore its resulting adverse impact
analysis was reasonable as well. ITC Br. at 35–40.
In its underselling analysis, the Commission considered numerous data
points, including predominant overselling by subject imports over the POI, the
[[ ]]] volume of confirmed lost sales by reason of price, and the importance
that surveyed purchasers reportedly attached to non-price factors when making
purchasing decisions. Views at 86. Based upon this evidence, the Commission
concluded that subject imports did not significantly undersell the domestic like
product and did not significantly suppress or depress domestic prices. Id. at 91.
The court has already established that the Commission’s underselling
analysis was supported by substantial evidence, see supra Section I, and the court
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therefore concludes that the Commission’s resulting adverse impact analysis was
reasonable as well. While DAK I instructs that remand may be warranted where
an adverse impact determination rests on a faulty underselling finding, the court
sustains the adverse impact determination here because the Commission’s
underselling analysis finds substantial support in the record.
III. The Commission reasonably performed its threat of material injury
analysis
Plaintiffs argue that the Commission’s threat determination warrants
remand because of the Commission’s “erroneous overselling and supply constraints
determinations” and because the Commission “failed to consider” certain record
evidence and arguments. Aluminum Br. at 35. In response, the Commission
contends that these arguments are “largely derivative” of Plaintiffs’ earlier positions
regarding price effects and adverse impact – which, as discussed supra, the
Commission disputes. ITC Br. at 40 (citing Aluminum Br. at 35–38).
Section 771(7)(F) of the Act directs the Commission to determine whether a
U.S. industry is threatened with material injury by analyzing whether “further
dumped or subsidized imports are imminent and whether material injury by reason
of imports would occur unless an order is issued or a suspension agreement is
accepted.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(F)(ii). “In determining whether an industry in the
United States is threatened with material injury by reason . . . of the subject
merchandise,” the Commission considers several relevant economic factors. Id. §
1677(7)(F)(i). The Commission considers these threat factors “as a whole” in
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determining whether “further dumped or subsidized imports are imminent and
whether material injury by reason of subject imports would occur unless an order is
issued.” Id. § 1677(7)(F)(ii). These factors include likely volume, likely price effects,
and likely impact. Id. § 1677(7)(F)(i)(I) –(IX).
Here, in concluding that subject imports did not pose an imminent threat of
material injury to the domestic industry, the Commission reasonably determined
that (A) the likely volume of subject imports did not support a threat determination;
(B) subject imports were not likely to have significant price effects in the imminent
future; and (C) subject imports were not likely to have a significant adverse impact
on the domestic industry.
(A) Likely Volume
Plaintiffs challenge the Commission’s likely volume of subject imports
determination on the ground that “subject imports undisputedly increased over the
POI and in interim 2024 as compared with interim 2023.” Aluminum Br. at 35
(citing Petitioners’ Prehearing Br. at 113; Views at 111–12). In plaintiffs’ view, the
Commission improperly “disregarded that growth as predictive of future trends
based in large part on its erroneous supply constraints determination.” Id.
Plaintiffs also contend that the Commission “failed to meaningfully
acknowledge the substantial increase in subject market share at the end of the
period” – namely a [[ ]]] percent increase in interim 2024.” Id. at 36. This interim
period growth, plaintiffs argue, could not have been explained by domestic industry
supply constraints, because supply constraints would have dissipated by 2024. Id.
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Instead, in plaintiffs’ view, “such a surge demonstrates the extent of subject
producers’ interest in and dependence on the U.S. market, as well as their ability to
export huge volumes of extrusions to the United States within a very short
timeframe.” Id.
Finally, plaintiffs challenge the Commission’s explanation that “the
seasonality of demand” impacted the March 2024 increase in subject import market
share. Id. Plaintiffs reason that March 2021 and March 2023 correspond to the
same season as March 2024, and therefore seasonality “does not explain why
subject imports were so much greater at the end of the period than in either of those
prior years.” Id. (citing Final Staff Report at Table IV-13).
Despite plaintiffs’ arguments, however, the Commission reasonably
determined that the likely volume of subject imports did not support a threat
determination. The Commission initiated its likely volume analysis by considering
that subject import volume and market share increased from 2021 to 2022 because
of domestic industry supply constraints and declined from 2022 to 2023 when
apparent U.S. consumption weakened. Views at 111–12. Given that the court has
already concluded that the Commission’s supply constraints analysis was
reasonable, see supra Section II.A., the court continues to hold here that the
Commission reasonably relied upon supply constraint evidence to determine that
the likely volume of subject imports did not support a threat determination.
Regarding interim 2024 market share, the Commission expressly
acknowledged the increase in imports’ market share during that period and
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ultimately concluded that such an increase was largely attributable to importers’
awareness of impending duties. See Views at 112. As the Commission explained,
this increase in interim 2024 market share “reflects elevated subject imports during
one month, March 2024” – and such an increase “would have been influenced by
Commerce’s impending preliminary determinations and possible imposition of
provisional measures.” Id. at 112–13. The Commission correctly notes here that
the Act explicitly grants the Commission discretion to discount post-petition data in
recognition of this very phenomenon that market share may increase as importers
race to ship subject merchandise into the United States at a lower duty rate in
anticipation of impeding duty increases. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(I). In sum, the
Commission acknowledged the increase in subject import market share in interim
2024 and reasonably determined that such increase was attributable to other
factors such as anticipation of impeding duty increases.
Furthermore, the Commission’s references to seasonality do not undermine
its likely volume analysis. Here, plaintiffs argue that seasonality cannot explain
the March 2024 surge, because subject imports did not see comparable increases in
March 2021 or March 2023. Aluminum Br. at 36–37. Nevertheless, the
Commission did not identify seasonality as the sole explanation for that increase;
rather, the Commission found that elevated subject import volume in March was
likely influenced by Commerce’s impending preliminary determination and the
possible imposition of provisional measures – in addition to seasonal demand
swings as yet another factor. Views at 112–113. Thus, even assuming that
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seasonality alone might not account for the unusually high March 2024 volume, the
Commission reasonably concluded that the March 2024 increase reflected
temporary circumstances rather than a broader trend indicating that significant
increases in subject import volumes were imminent. See id.
Finally, the Commission’s likely volume finding also rests upon several other
sources of record evidence, none of which plaintiffs challenge. See id. at 113–16
(relying on at least nine other types of evidence, including subject producer
production capacity, capacity utilization, home market shipments, and more).
Because the Commission reasonably considered the record evidence and explained
its analysis and conclusions, the Commission’s negative likely volume finding is
supported by substantial evidence and otherwise in accordance with law.
(B) Likely Price Effects
Plaintiffs argue that the Commission relied upon the purportedly flawed
underselling analysis discussed above to reach its likely price effects determination.
Aluminum Br. at 37. In response, the Commission points again to its underselling
analysis and explains that pricing data indicate “predominant and increasing
overselling by subject imports” during the POI, justifying a negative likely price
effects determination. ITC Br. at 43 (citing Views at 119).
Given that the court has concluded that the Commission’s underselling
analysis was reasonable, plaintiffs’ argument here fails as well. See supra Section
II.A. Furthermore, beyond the overselling evidence discussed above, the
Commission also considered additional evidence about price effects, including
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evidence that subject imports did not suppress prices for the domestic like product
to a significant degree. See Views at 118–19. The Commission summarized:
Given our finding that cumulated subject import volumes are not likely to increase significantly in the imminent future, the absence of significant underselling or adverse price effects during the POI, the fact that subject imports increasingly oversold the domestic like product over the POI (with underselling declining to just 19.2 percent by volume in the interim period), and the absence of any evidence that subject import pricing patterns are likely to change significantly in the imminent future, we further find that the lack of significant underselling and price effects observed during the POI will likely continue in the imminent future.
Id. at 119.
Because the Commission reasonably considered the record evidence as a
whole and thoroughly explained its decision, its likely price effects determination is
supported by substantial evidence and otherwise in accordance with law.
(C) Likely Impact
Plaintiffs argue that the Commission’s likely impact discussion turned on
erroneous overselling findings and related supply constraints determinations, so its
likely impact determination “must be remanded.” Aluminum Br. at 37–38.
Despite plaintiffs’ arguments to the contrary, however, the Commission
reasonably considered the record and explained how it weighed the relevant data.
See Views at 119–22. In doing so, the Commission principally relied on its earlier
supply constraints and underselling determinations, which the court has already
sustained. See supra Section II.A.; Views at 119–20. The Commission also
considered other record evidence when conducting its likely impact analysis,
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including the domestic industry’s financial performance, trade indicators, volume
and market share figures, operating and net margins, and capacity utilization. See
Views at 119–21. In sum, the Commission reasonably weighed the totality of record
evidence and concluded, “[o]n balance,” that “the industry is not vulnerable.” Id. at
121. The court may not reweigh this evidence.
CONCLUSION
The court concludes that the Commission’s price effects, adverse impact, and
threat determinations are supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with
law. Judgment will enter accordingly, sustaining the Commission’s final
determination in full.
/s/ Joseph A. Laroski, Jr.
Judge
Dated: September 2, 2026
New York, New York
来源：CIT · Slip Opinions · cit.uscourts.gov